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We propose a quantum secret sharing scheme between m-party and n-party using three conjugate
bases, i.e. six states. A sequence of single photons, each of which is prepared in one of the six
states, is used directly to encode classical information in the quantum secret sharing process. In
this scheme, each of all m members in group 1 choose randomly their own secret key individually
and independently, and then directly encode their respective secret information on the states of
single photons via unitary operations, then the last one (the mth member of group 1) sends 1/n
of the resulting qubits to each of group 2. By measuring their respective qubits, all members in
group 2 share the secret information shared by all members in group 1. The secret message shared
by group 1 and group 2 in such a way that neither subset of each group nor the union of a subset
of group 1 and a subset of group 2 can extract the secret message, but each whole group (all the
members of each group) can. The scheme is asymptotically 100% in efficiency. It makes the Trojan
horse attack with a multi-photon signal, the fake-signal attack with EPR pairs, the attack with
single photons, and the attack with invisible photons to be nullification. We show that it is secure
and has an advantage over the one based on two conjugate bases. We also give the upper bounds of
the average success probabilities for dishonest agent eavesdropping encryption using the fake-signal
attack with any two-particle entangled states. This protocol is feasible with present-day technique.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd; 03.67.Hk; 89.70.+c
I. INTRODUCTION
Secret sharing is a powerful technique in computer sci-
ence, which enables secure and robust communication
in information networks, such as the internet, telecom-
munication systems and distributed computers. The se-
curity of these networks can be enhanced using quan-
tum resources to protect the information. Such schemes
have been termed quantum secret sharing. There are
many kinds one-to-multi-party quantum secret sharing
schemes, such as with entanglement [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,
9, 10] and without entanglement [11]. The basic idea of
secret sharing in the simplest case is that a secret of one
person, say Alice, is shared between other two persons,
say Bob and Charlie, in such a way that it can only be
reconstructed if both collaborate. In a more general case,
notably for secure key management, a t-out-of-n proto-
col (or (t, n)-threshold scheme) with 1 ≤ t ≤ n spreads a
secret to n participants in a way that any t participants
can reconstruct it [12]. Lance et al. have reported an ex-
perimental demonstration of a (2,3) threshold quantum
secret sharing scheme [13]. The interesting aspect of ex-
ploring quantum mechanics for secret sharing is that it
allows for unconditionally secure distribution of the in-
formation to the participants.
In Ref.[1], Hillery et al. proposed one-to-two-party and
one-to-three-party secret sharing schemes via maximally
entangled three-particle and four-particle states, respec-
tively. Xiao et al. [9] reformulated the protocol [1] in a
simple mathematical terms and generalized the protocol
[1] into arbitrary number parties case. The main pur-
pose of Ref.[5] is to show that it is also possible to realize
secret sharing as in Ref.[1] with two-particle quantum en-
tanglement. At the same time, Karlsson et al. [5] also
presented a detailed discussion of how to detect eaves-
dropping, or how to detect a dishonest party in the pro-
tocols. Quantum secret sharing protocol provides for se-
cure secret sharing by enabling one to determine whether
an eavesdropper has been active during the secret sharing
procedure. But it is not easy to implement such multi-
party secret sharing tasks [1, 5, 9], since the efficiency of
preparing even tripartite or four-partite entangled states
is very low [14, 15], at the same time the efficiency of the
existing quantum secret sharing protocols using quan-
tum entanglement can only approach 50%. Recently, a
scheme for quantum secret sharing without entanglement
has been proposed by Guo and Guo [11]. They presented
an idea to directly encode the qubit of quantum key dis-
tribution and accomplish one splitting a message into
many parts to achieve one-to-multi-party secret sharing
only by product states. The theoretical efficiency is dou-
bled to approach 100%.
In the modern society, signatures on documents, au-
thentications, encryptions, and decryptions are often
needed by more than one person, especially by all per-
sons of two groups. Therefore, the secret sharing between
many parties and many parties is indeed required. The
advantage of secret sharing between many parties and
many parties is that honest agents can keep the dishon-
est ones from doing any damage when they appear in
the process for business. More recently, we suggest a
quantum secret sharing scheme employing two conjugate
2bases, i.e. four states, of single qubits to achieve the se-
cret sharing between multi-party and multi-party with a
sequence of single photons [16]. Deng et al. [17] and Li
et al. [18] showed the weakness of our protocol [16]. We
proposed an improved protocol [19], which can avoid the
flaws and is secure against the attack with invisible pho-
tons [20] and the fake-signal attack with any two-particle
entangled states (the special case of which is the fake-
signal attack with EPR pairs [21]).
In this paper, we propose a quantum secret sharing
scheme between m-party and n-party by using three
rather than two conjugate bases. In this scheme, all m
parties in group 1 select their own secrets individually
and independently, and split their respective secret in-
formation among the whole group 2 (n parties) in such
a way that neither part members of either group 1 or
group 2 nor the union of a subset of group 1 and a subset
of group 2 has any knowledge of the combination of all
senders (group 1), but only by working together can all
members of each group jointly determine what the com-
bination of all senders (group 1) is. In this case it is the
secret information of each person in group 1 that has been
split up into n pieces, no one of which separately contains
the original information, but whose combination does.
We show that this m-to-n-party scheme is more secure
than the one in [16, 19] based on two conjugate bases,
i.e. four states, such as its security against the Trojan
horse attack [17], the two attacks stated in Ref. [18], the
attack with invisible photons [20], and the attack with
EPR pairs [21]. In fact, we show that this protocol is
secure against more general attack (the attack with any
two-particle entangled state) than the attack with EPR
pairs. The advantage of the present scheme is that two
honest agents, one in group 1 and the other in group 2,
can keep the dishonest ones ( other m+ n− 2 members)
and the m + n + 1 party (an ’external’ Eavesdropper,
Eve) from doing any damage. That is, this protocol is
secure as long as there is one agent at each group being
honest. Comparing with the efficiency 50% limiting for
the existing quantum secret sharing protocols with quan-
tum entanglement, the present scheme can also be 100%
efficient in principle.
II. QUANTUM KEY SHARING BETWEEN
MULTI-PARTY AND MULTI-PARTY BASED ON
SIX STATES
Let Alice 1, Alice 2, · · · , Alice m, and Bob 1, Bob
2, · · · , Bob n be respective all members of group 1 and
group 2. m parties of group 1 want quantum key sharing
with n parties of group 2 such that neither part of each
group nor the union of a part of group 1 and a part of
group 2 knows the key, but only all members of each
group can collaborate to determine what the string (key)
is. Next we put forward an m-to-n-party quantum secret
sharing scheme by using of three conjugate bases, or six
states, to achieve the aim mentioned above—the secret
sharing between m parties and n parties. Let us see how
this works in detail.
M1. Alice 1 creates a random nN bit string A1 and a
random nN trit string B1, where a
1
k and b
1
k are uniformly
chosen from {0, 1} and {0, 1, 2}, respectively. She then
encodes these strings as a block of nN qubits (nN single
photons),
|Ψ1〉 = ⊗nNk=1|ψa1kb1k〉, (1)
where a1k is the kth bit of A1 (and similar for B1). Each
qubit |ψa1
k
b1
k
〉 is in one of the six states
|ψ00〉 = |0〉, |ψ10〉 = |1〉,
|ψ01〉 = |+〉 = |0〉+|1〉√
2
, |ψ11〉 = |−〉 = |0〉−|1〉√
2
,
|ψ02〉 = |+ y〉 = |0〉+i|1〉√
2
, |ψ12〉 = | − y〉 = |0〉−i|1〉√
2
.
(2)
The value of b1k determines the basis. If b
1
k is 0 then a
1
k
is encoded in the Z basis {|0〉, |1〉}; if b1k is 1 then a1k is
encoded in the X basis {|+〉, |−〉}; if b1k is 2 then a1k is
encoded in the Y basis {| + y〉, | − y〉}. Note that the
six states are not all mutually orthogonal, therefore no
measurement can distinguish between all of them with
certainty. Alice 1 then sends the sequence of nN single
photons to Alice 2 over their public quantum communi-
cation channel.
M2. When Alice 2 receives the nN qubits, she chooses
randomly a large subset of photons as the samples for
eavesdropping check. First, she uses a special filter to
prevent the invisible photons from entering the operation
system, splits each sample signal with a photon number
splitter (PNS: 50/50), and then measures each signal in
the measurement basis (MB) Z, or X , or Y at random.
Obviously if two or more photons in one signal are de-
tected, then Alice 2 aborts the communication. More-
over, she analyzes the error rate εs of the samples by
requiring Alice 1 to tell her the original states of the
samples. If the error rate is higher than the threshold
chosen by all Alices and Bobs [24], Alice 2 aborts the
communication, otherwise she goes ahead. After Alice 2’s
checking, the number of the remaining unchecked qubits
(photons) must be less than nN . However, for conve-
nience, we suppose that Alice 2 still has the nN photons.
Alice 2 selects two random nN -trit strings A2 and B2.
She performs the operation σ0 = I = |0〉〈0| + |1〉〈1|,
σ1 = iσy = |0〉〈1| − |1〉〈0| or σ2 = σz = |0〉〈0| − |1〉〈1| on
each qubit |ψa1
k
b1
k
〉 if the corresponding trit value a2k of
A2 is 0, 1 or 2, respectively. Then, she applies a unitary
operator U0 = I, U1 =
1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)〈0|− i√
2
(|0〉− |1〉)〈1|,
or U2 =
1√
2
(|0〉+ i|1〉)〈0|+ 1√
2
(|0〉 − i|1〉)〈1| on the kth
photon depending on b2k = 0, 1, or 2, respectively. We
denote each of the resulting qubit states as |ψa2
k
b2
k
〉. After
that, Alice 2 inserts randomly N2 decoy single photons
into nN photons encoded by her, where each of the de-
coy single photons is randomly in one of the states in
Eq.(2). Then she sends Alice 3 the resulting (nN +N2)-
qubit state |Ψ2〉 = ⊗nN+N2k=1 |ψa2kb2k〉. Notice that |ψa2kb2k〉
is determined by a1k, b
1
k, a
2
k, b
2
k.
3The nice feature of the unitary transformations
iσy, σx, σz is that they leave bases Z, X and Y un-
changed, and each of them flips the states in two mea-
surement bases. For example, σ1 = iσy flips the states in
both bases X and Z such that
σ1|0〉 = −|1〉, σ1|1〉 = |0〉,
σ1|+〉 = |−〉, σ1|−〉 = −|+〉. (3)
The operators U1 and U2 cyclically permute the three
bases Z, X and Y such that
U1 : {|0〉, |1〉} → {|+〉, |−〉} → {|+ y〉, | − y〉} → {|0〉, |1〉}
(4)
and
U2 : {|0〉, |1〉} → {|+y〉, |−y〉} → {|+〉, |−〉} → {|0〉, |1〉}.
(5)
M3. Alice i (3 ≤ i ≤ m) operates the qubits like Alice
2 does. That is, first, she select a large subset of photons
at random as the samples for eavesdropping check. For
determining the error rate of the samples, all the mem-
bers before Alice i must tell Alice i the original state or
the operations they chose in a random sequential order.
Because of nice feature of the unitary transformations
iσy, σx, σz, U1, U2, each qubit |ψai
k
bi
k
〉 of the resulting
nN + Ni−1 qubit product state ⊗nN+Ni−1k=1 |ψaikbik〉 is the
eigenstate of σz, σx, or σy if (b
1
k+b
2
k+ · · ·+bik)mod3 = 0,
1, or 2, respectively. Evidently, |ψai
k
bi
k
〉 is govern by
a1k, a
2
k, · · · , aik, b1k, b2k, · · · , bik. Here i = 3, 4, · · · ,m. Sec-
ond, Alice i generates two random (nN + Ni−1)-trit
strings Ai and Bi, applies σ0, σ1, or σ2 on the k-th pho-
ton depending aik = 0, 1, or 2 and performs U0, U1, or
U2 on the resulting state of the k-th photon according to
bik = 0, 1, 2. Finally, Alice i inserts randomly Ni −Ni−1
decoy single photons into nN + Ni−1 photons encoded
by her.
M4. Alice i (3 ≤ i ≤ m−1) sends the resulting nN+Ni
qubit product state |Ψi〉 = ⊗nN+Nik=1 |ψaikbik〉 to Alice i+1.
Without loss of generality, we can suppose that nN +
Nm = nN (Alice m can manage it). Alice m sends N -
qubit product states |Ψm1 〉 = ⊗N−1j=0 |ψamnj+1bmnj+1〉, |Ψm2 〉 =
⊗N−1j=0 |ψamnj+2bmnj+2〉, · · · , |Ψmn 〉 = ⊗N−1j=0 |ψamnj+nbmnj+n〉 of
the resulting nN -qubit state |Ψm〉 = ⊗nNk=1|ψamk bmk 〉 to
Bob 1, Bob 2, · · · , Bob n, respectively.
M5. When all Bob 1, Bob 2, · · · , and Bob n have
received their respective nN qubits, each of them first
randomly and independently chooses enough photons as
samples and measures each of them in MB Z, or X or Y
at random. Then they ask Alice 1, Alice 2, · · · , and Alice
m to announce publicly the aikt and b
i
kt
of the samples in a
random sequential order. Here kt is the label of the sam-
ple chosen for eavesdropping check, and i = 1, 2, · · · ,m.
After that Bobs publish their measurement outcomes and
the measurement bases. All Alices and Bobs discard all
check photons except those for which Bobs measured in
the MB Z, X or Y according to (
∑m
i=1 b
i
kt
)mod3 = 0,
1 or 2, and compare the values of their remaining check
photons. If the error rate of the remaining samples is
reasonably less than a threshold, then they continue to
the quantum communication. Otherwise they abort it.
M6. Alice 1, Alice 2, · · · , and Alice m ask all Bobs to
discard the decoy photons that are not chosen for eaves-
dropping check, and then publicly announce the strings
B1, B2, · · · , and Bm at random, respectively. Bob 1,
Bob 2, · · · , and Bob n then measure each qubit of their
respective strings in MB Z or X or Y according to the
result of addition modulo 3 of corresponding trit values of
strings B1, B2, · · · , Bm. Thus, if (
∑m
i=1 b
i
nj+l)mod3 = 0,
then Bob l measures |ψam
nj+l
bm
nj+l
〉 in the Z basis; if
(
∑m
i=1 b
i
nj+l)mod3 = 1, he measures in the X basis; if
(
∑m
i=1 b
i
nj+l)mod3 = 2, he measures in the Y basis. After
his measurement, Bob l can extract out the combination
of all Alices’s encoding information.
Let measurement result of Bob l be Cl = {cnj+l}N−1j=0
and the combination of all Alices’s encoding information
be A = {ak}nNk=1, where ak is determined by all aik and
bik, and ak and cnj+l are 0 or 1, corresponding to the +1
and -1 eigenstates of σz , σx, and σy . Clearly, if there are
no eavesdropper and noise, there must be cnj+l = anj+l.
Here l = 1, 2, · · · , n and i = 1, 2, · · · ,m.
M7. All Alices and Bobs perform some tests to deter-
mine how much noise or eavesdropping happened during
their communication. Alice 1, Alice 2, · · · , and Alice m
select some photons njr+ l (of their nN photons) at ran-
dom, and publicly announce the selection. All Bobs and
all Alices then publish and compare the values of these
checked bits. If they find too few anjr+l = cnjr+l, then
they abort and re-try the protocol from the start.
M8. The XOR results ⊕nl=1cnjs+l of Bob l’s cor-
responding bits cnjs+l of the rest unchecked photons
njs + l of ⊗N−1j=0 |ψamnj+1bmnj+1〉, ⊗N−1j=0 |ψamnj+2bmnj+2〉, · · · ,
⊗N−1j=0 |ψamnj+nbmnj+n〉 can be used as raw keys for secret
sharing between all Alices and all Bobs.
Remark 1. It is necessary for Alice 2, Alice 3, · · · , Alice
m make a eavesdropping check before they operates the
photon signals, otherwise dishonest agent Alice i0 can
obtain secret messages of Alice i0 + 1, · · · , Alice m with
a Trojan horse attack and invisible photons attack. The
reasons are similar to that stated in Ref. [17, 23].
Remark 2. By random sampling in M5, the security
flaw indicated in [18] can be avoided in the present pro-
tocol. That is, for this protocol, the two types attacks,
the attack with EPR pairs and the attack with single
photons, proposed in [18] are of no effect. The reason is
as follows. Evidently, Bobs’ measurements collapse the
check samples into the states of a single particle. That
is, all Bobs’ measurements remove the entanglements be-
tween check photons and other eavesdropping particles,
which correspond to that the attacker Alice i0 sends Bobs
single quantum states Eq.(2) whether in the attack with
EPR pairs or the attack with single photons. Appar-
ently, we can find out the attacker in the attack with
4single photons via Alices’ publishing their respective en-
coding information in a random sequential order. Since
Bob l asks Alices to announce the aikt and b
i
kt
in a ran-
dom sequential order, the attacker will not be the last one
to answer the Bob l’s enquiry with a probability m−1
m
. If
there is a Alice to be asked after the attacker Alice i0, Al-
ice i0 can not distinguish the quantum state intercepted
by her with certainty, and can only guess ai0kt and b
i0
kt
to
answer the inquiry. It is not difficult to deduce that the
error rate of the samples that Bobs measured in MB Z,
X , or Y corresponding to (
∑m
i=1 b
i
kt
)mod3 = 0, 1, or 2 is
more than m−1
2m
.
Remark 3. It is very nice that this scheme can make the
fake-signal attack with any two-particle entangled state
(the special case of which is the fake-signal attack with
EPR pairs [21]) to be nullification. The argument goes
as follows:
Suppose that the eavesdropper Alice i0 (who could be
any dishonest one of Alices) generates nN +Ni0 general
EPR pairs in the state ⊗nN+Ni0k=1 |Ψk〉. Here
|Ψk〉 = |Ψ〉 = |0〉A|α〉E + |1〉A|β〉E , (6)
|α〉E and |β〉E are unnormalized states of the S-level (S ≥
2) particle E. Note that the special case of |Ψ〉 is an EPR
pair (when 〈α|β〉 = 〈β|α〉 = 0, 〈α|α〉 = 〈β|β〉 = 1
2
, |Ψk〉 =
|Ψ〉 is an EPR pair). Alice i0 keeps the second particle
E of each |Ψk〉, replaces the original single photons in
the state |Ψi0〉 with the first particle A of each |Ψk〉 and
sends the sequence SA of nN+Ni0 qubit A to Alice i0+1
(this is a more general situation than that in [21]).
If |Ψ〉 is not a two-particle maximally entangled state
(EPR pair), then Alice i0 can not but makes mistakes in
M2 (if i0 = 1) or M3 (if i0 > 1), because Alice i0 can not
distinguish between |α〉 and |β〉, between |α〉 + |β〉 and
|α〉−|β〉, and between |α〉+i|β〉 and |α〉−i|β〉 perfectly.
Thus Alice i0 + 1 can detect the cheating of Alice i0 in
M2 (if i0 = 1) or M3 (if i0 > 1). Next we only assume
that |Ψ〉 is an EPR pair. Alice i0 + 1 in the step M2
(if i0 = 1) or M3 (if i0 > 1) cannot detect this cheating
as Alice i0 is able to produce no errors in the results if
Alice i0 is asked to announce her encryption a
i0
s and b
i0
s
of the samples after Alice 1, · · · , Alice i0−1. But if Alice
i0 is not the last to announce her encoding information,
then her cheating introduces errors and can be found out
by Alice i0 + 1 in M3 (if i0 > 1) without fail. However,
when the dishonest Alice i0 is Alice 1, this cheating of her
cannot be found out by Alice 2 as it does not introduce
errors in the results.
Alice 1 intercepts SA while it was sent to Alice i1 (2 <
i1 ≤ m) or Bobs (if Alice 1 never intercepts SA, then
she can not obtain any information, although this kind
of eavesdropping can not be found in the eavesdropping
check. So it does not make any sense for Alice 1 to do
this kind of eavesdropping ).
The object of Eve is to obtain all Alices’ encoding in-
formation Ai and Bi. In order to achieve this purpose,
Alice 1 must manage to distinguish nine unitary opera-
tions σ0, σ1, σ2, U1, U1σ1, U1σ2, U2, U2σ1, and U2σ2 (if
i1 = 3) or more than these nine operations (if i1 ≥ 4).
That is, Alice 1 must manage to distinguish the following
9 states
|χ1〉 = |Ψ〉 = |0〉|α〉+ |1〉|β〉,
|χ2〉 = σ1|Ψ〉 = −|1〉|α〉+ |0〉|β〉,
|χ3〉 = σ2|Ψ〉 = |0〉|α〉 − |1〉|β〉,
|χ4〉 = U1|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)|α〉 − i√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉)|β〉,
|χ5〉 = U1σ1|Ψ〉 = i√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉)|α〉+ 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)|β〉,
|χ6〉 = U1σ2|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)|α〉+ i√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉)|β〉,
|χ7〉 = U2|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ i|1〉)|α〉+ 1√
2
(|0〉 − i|1〉)|β〉,
|χ8〉 = U2σ1|Ψ〉 = − 1√
2
(|0〉 − i|1〉)|α〉 + 1√
2
(|0〉+ i|1〉)|β〉,
|χ9〉 = U2σ2|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ i|1〉)|α〉 − 1√
2
(|0〉 − i|1〉)|β〉,
(7)
or even more, where σi and Uiσi act on the first parti-
cle, and |Ψ〉 is an EPR pair. These states belongs to the
four dimension subspace W of the entire Hilbert space
H spanned by |0〉|α〉, |0〉|β〉, |1〉|α〉 and |1〉|β〉, and it is
impossible for more than four states being mutually or-
thogonal, therefore these states can not be reliably distin-
guished [24]. Thus Alice 1’s eavesdropping can be found
in M3 by Alice i1 or in M5 by all Bobs. Therefore the
present quantum secret sharing protocol is secure against
the fake-signal attack with any two-particle entangled
state (the special case of which is EPR pairs).
On the other hand, in the present protocol, Alices in-
sert randomly decoy single photons into the signal pho-
tons in M2 or M3. The eavesdropping check on the decoy
single photons is the same as that on the signal photons.
That is, first Alice i measures (or all Bobs measure) each
decoy single photon in MB Z, X or Y at random, then
she asks (they ask) Alice 1, Alice 2, · · · , Alice i−1 (all Al-
ices) to tell her (them) their encoding information ats, b
t
s
of the samples in a random sequential order. Note that
there is at least one honest agent in one communication
group. Therefore the dishonest agent can be found by
the eavesdropping checks on the decoy photons by the
honest agents. The principle of the checking procedures
is the same as that in six states quantum key distribution
protocol [25, 26].
Next we give the upper bounds of the average success
probabilities of two cases.
Case I. The upper bound of the average success proba-
bility distinguishing the nine states in Eq.(7), where |Ψ〉
is a general two-particle entangled state. Since the non-
orthogonal states can not be reliably distinguished [24],
distinguishing the nine states is equivalent to find |α〉 and
|β〉 such that
〈χi|χj〉 = δij . (8)
5However, there are no |α〉, |β〉 satisfying Eq.(8), as even
there are no |α〉, |β〉 satisfying the following equations
〈χ1|χ2〉 = 〈α|β〉 − 〈β|α〉 = 0, (9)
〈χ1|χ3〉 = 〈α|α〉 − 〈β|β〉 = 0, (10)
〈χ1|χ4〉 = 1√
2
(1 + i)〈α|α〉 − 1√
2
(1 − i)〈α|β〉 = 0, (11)
〈χ1|χ5〉 = i√
2
〈α|α〉− 1√
2
〈α|β〉− i√
2
〈β|α〉+ 1√
2
〈β|β〉 = 0.
(12)
Thus, Eve can not reliably distinguish the nine states in
Eq.(7).
We calculate the upper bound of the maximal suc-
cess probability for Eve unambiguously discriminating 9
states in Eq.(7). Let
1√
2
〈α|β〉 = x+ iy,
1√
2
〈α|α〉 = z,
1√
2
〈β|β〉 = t,
(13)
then
1√
2
〈β|α〉 = x− iy,
z > 0, t > 0, z + t =
1√
2
, (14)
1
2
9∑
i,j=1
i6=j
|〈χi|χj〉|
= 6
√
2|y|+ 3
√
2|z − t|+ 6
√
2|x|
+4
√
(x+ y + z)2 + (x+ y − t)2
+6
√
(x− y − z)2 + (x− y + t)2
+4
√
(x− y + z)2 + (x− y − t)2
+4
√
(x+ y − z)2 + (x+ y + t)2
+
√
2
√
1
2
+ (2x+ 2y + z − t)2
+
3√
2
√
1
2
+ (2x− 2y − z + t)2
+
√
2
√
1
2
+ (2x− 2y + z − t)2
+
√
2
√
1
2
+ (2x+ 2y − z + t)2. (15)
By simply calculating, we obtain that
9∑
i,j=1
i6=j
|〈χi|χj〉| ≥ 27. (16)
Moreover, the equality holds if
x = y = 0, t = z =
1
2
√
2
, (17)
That is, the minimum of
∑9
i,j=1
i6=j
|〈χi|χj〉| occurs at
〈α|β〉 = 0, 〈α|α〉 = 〈β|β〉 = 1
2
. (18)
The average success probability P1 [27] for unambigu-
ous identification of the nine states in Eq.(7) is
P1 ≤ 1− 1
9− 1
9∑
i,j=1
i6=j
√
1
9
× 1
9
|〈χi|χj〉| = 1− 3
8
=
5
8
. (19)
Case II. The upper bound of the average success prob-
ability classifying the following three sets
{|χ11〉, |χ12〉, |χ13〉},
{|χ21〉, |χ22〉, |χ23〉}, (20)
{|χ31〉, |χ32〉, |χ33〉}
for gaining secret information Ai, where
|χ11〉 = |χ1〉, |χ12〉 = |χ4〉, |χ13〉 = |χ7〉,
|χ21〉 = |χ2〉, |χ22〉 = |χ5〉, |χ23〉 = |χ8〉,
|χ31〉 = |χ3〉, |χ32〉 = |χ6〉, |χ33〉 = |χ9〉. (21)
It is not difficult to derive
3∑
i,j=1
i6=j
3∑
k,l=1
√
ηikηjl
(N −mi)(N −mj) |〈χik|χjl〉|
=
3∑
i,j=1
i6=j
3∑
k,l=1
√
1
9
× 1
9
(9− 3)× (9− 3) |〈χik|χjl〉|
=
1
27
(6
√
2|y|+ 3
√
2|z − t|+ 6
√
2|x|
+2
√
(x+ y + z)2 + (x + y − t)2
+6
√
(x− y − z)2 + (x − y + t)2
+2
√
(x− y + z)2 + (x − y − t)2
+2
√
(x+ y − z)2 + (x + y + t)2
+
3√
2
√
1
2
+ (2x− 2y − z + t)2
+
1√
2
√
1
2
+ (2x− 2y + z − t)2
+
1√
2
√
1
2
+ (2x+ 2y − z + t)2
+
1√
2
√
1
2
+ (2x+ 2y + z − t)2). (22)
6A little thought shows that
3∑
i,j=1
i6=j
3∑
k,l=1
√
ηikηjl
(N −mi)(N −mj) |〈χik|χjl〉| ≥
1
3
. (23)
The equality occurs at
〈α|β〉 = 0, 〈α|α〉 = 〈β|β〉 = 1
2
. (24)
The average success probability P2 of conclusive quan-
tum states sets classification [28] is
P2 ≤ 1− 1
3
=
2
3
. (25)
From Eq.(19) and Eq.(25), we can see that Eve can not
deduce Ai and Bi by the probability more than
1
3
. Thus,
no matter what kind strategy the malicious Alice i0 use,
she will disturb the quantum system, make mistakes, and
therefore can be detected in M2, M3, M5, or M7. There-
fore not only the fake-signal attacking with EPR pairs
but also the fake-signal attacking with any two-particle
entangled states—general EPR pairs can not work for
the quantum secret sharing protocol with the six states.
Note that Eve can not deduce Ai and Bi by the prob-
ability more than 1
5
by Eq.(15) and Eq(19) in [19], but
in the present protocol, for getting all Alices’ encoding
information Ai and Bi, Eve must manage to distinguish
nine states in Eq.(7) or even more. It implies that this
quantum secret sharing scheme between multi-party and
multi-party with six states is much more secure than that
with four states in [16, 19].
Remark 4. For safety, Alice 2, Alice 3, · · · , Alice m
must utilize at least three of I, σx, iσy, and σz to en-
code their secret message. If they use two, then 1
3
secret
information will be leaked.
Remark 5. Alice i (2 ≤ i ≤ m) applying unitary op-
eration U1 or U2 randomly on some qubits is to achieve
the aim such that no one or part of Alice 1, · · · , Alice
m can extract some information of others [16].
Remark 6. This protocol is safer than that with four
states [16, 19], which can also be shown in section III.
This secret sharing protocol between m parties and n
parties is almost 100% efficient as all the keys can be used
in the ideal case of no eavesdropping, while the quantum
secret sharing protocols with entanglement states [1] can
be at most 50% efficient in principle. In this protocol,
quantum memory is required to store the qubits which
has been shown available in the present experiment tech-
nique [29]. However, if no quantum memory is employed,
all Bobs measure their qubits before Alice i’s (1 ≤ i ≤ m)
announcement of basis, the efficiency of the present pro-
tocol falls to 33.33%.
III. SECURITY
By means of the special filters, photon number split-
ters, single-photon detectors, the eavesdropping check of
each member Alice i (i = 2, 3, · · · ,m) in group 1, insert-
ing of decoy states in M2 and M3, unitary operations in
M2 and M3, and the random measurements of all Bobs
on their respective qubits chosen at random, either an
(m+n+1)-th party (an ”external” eavesdropper) or the
dishonest agent of two groups can be found by the honest
agents. Therefore all Alices and all Bobs must be honest.
The encoding of secret messages by Alice i (1 ≤ i ≤ m)
is identical to the process in a one-time-pad encryption
where the text is encrypted with a random key as the
state of the photon in the protocol is completely random.
The great feature of a one-time-pad encryption is that as
long as the key strings are truly secret, it is completely
safe and no secret messages can be leaked even if the
cipher-text is intercepted by the eavesdropper. Here the
secret sharing protocol is even more secure than the clas-
sical one-time-pad in the sense that an eavesdropper Eve
can not intercept the whole cipher-text as the photons’
measuring-basis is chosen randomly. So the transmission
of qubits between authorized members in the two groups
is secure. Thus the security of this secret sharing protocol
depends entirely on the second part when Alice m sends
the l-th sequence of N photons to Bob l (1 ≤ l ≤ n).
The process for ensuring a secure block of nN qubits
(n secure sequences of N photons) is similar to that in
quantum key distribution protocol based on six quan-
tum states [25, 26], in the following called BBBWB six-
state protocol. The process of this secret sharing be-
tween m parties and n parties after all Alices encoding
their respective messages using unitary operations is in
fact identical to n independent BBBWB six-state proto-
col processes, which has been proven unconditional se-
cure [30]. Lo [30] has demonstrated the unconditional
security of BBBWB six-state protocol up to a bit error
rate of 12.7 percents, by allowing only one-way classical
communications in the error correction/privacy amplifi-
cation procedure between Alice and Bob. This shows a
clear advantage of the six-state protocol over BB84 [31],
which has been proven to be secure up to 11 percents, if
only one-way classical communications are allowed. Lo
[30] has shown that an advantage of the six-state protocol
lies in the Alice and Bob’s ability to establish rigorously
from their test samples the non-trivial mutual informa-
tion between the bit-flip and phase error patterns. Thus
the security for the present quantum secret sharing be-
tween multi-party and multi-party is guaranteed.
In summary, we propose a scheme for quantum secret
sharing between multi-party and multi-party with three
conjugate bases, or six states, where no entanglement is
employed. In the protocol, Alice 1 prepares a sequence
of single photons in one of six different states accord-
ing to her two random classical strings, other Alice i
(2 ≤ i ≤ m) directly encodes her two random classical in-
formation strings on the resulting sequence of Alice (i−1)
via unitary operations, after that Alice m sends 1/n of
the sequence of single photons to each Bob l (1 ≤ l ≤ n).
Each Bob l measures his photons according to all Alices’
measuring-basis sequences. All Bobs must cooperate in
7order to infer the secret key shared by all Alices. Neither
a subset of either all Alices or all Bobs nor the union of
a subset of all Alices and a subset of all Bobs can extract
secret information, but each entire group (each of the en-
tire set of all Alices and the entire set of all Bobs) can.
This scheme has no secure flaws proposed in [17] and [18].
It is secure against the attack with invisible photons [20]
and the fake signal attack with any two-particle entan-
gled state (the special case of which is the attack with
EPR pairs [21]), and safer than the one [16, 19] based
on two conjugate bases, i.e. four states, which is secure.
This shows the advantage of our proposed scheme based
on six states over Ref.[16]. As entanglement, especially
the inaccessible multi-party entangled state, is not nec-
essary in the present quantum secret sharing protocol
between m-party and n-party, it may be more applicable
when the numbers m and n of the parties of secret shar-
ing are large. Its theoretic efficiency is also doubled to
approach 100%. This protocol is feasible with present-
day technique.
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